

Dr. Robert M. Warner
Archivist of the United States
National Archives and Records Service
Eighth Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20408

Dear Dr. Warner:

IN THE COURSE OF THE YEAR,

~~Recently,~~ Dr. Edward Weldon, Deputy Archivist of the United States, and several members of the NARS staff met with Mr. Thomas White, Director of Information Services, and several CIA staff members to discuss the problem of identifying information concerning intelligence sources and methods that may be found in unclassified records held at NARS. The concern was that NARS personnel, when reviewing records which carry no classification markings, might overlook information concerning intelligence sources and methods that requires protection. To aid NARS in overcoming this problem, it was agreed that CIA would draw up guidelines designed to help NARS personnel identify this type of information, which will then be set aside for review by CIA personnel. Such information will be protected under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect information concerning intelligence sources and methods.

The problem becomes more acute as systematic classification review at NARS progresses and involves documents of more recent years when CIA was becoming more active. ~~Such information~~ **UNMARKED DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST TO US** may well exist in earlier records and may have gone unnoticed during systematic review of those records; however, to review again that material in its entirety for this purpose would be a tremendous undertaking and possibly not worth the effort. As we gain additional experience we may be able to pinpoint where intelligence sources and methods information may be found. We would like to keep open the option of screening again certain categories of records at NARS that have undergone systematic review but may have a high potential for containing information requiring protection as determined by experience.


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The guidelines, which are attached, have been written with the following objectives: (1) to describe the various types of activities in which CIA engages; (2) to indicate the records which these activities would generate; and (3) to suggest where those records may be found particularly if they are unclassified. Since we do not have a great deal of experience with unclassified records of other U.S. Government agencies, the guidelines will be rather tentative. We hope that with experience they can be expanded and made more useful.

We appreciated the opportunity to discuss this issue with your personnel. They presented the problem very clearly and we found the frank and free exchange of views most informative and helpful. If you or your staff should desire further discussion of this issue, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,


Director of Information Services
Directorate of Administration

25X1

Attachment:

Guidelines to aid NARS personnel
identify unclassified information
concerning intelligence sources
and methods

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GUIDELINE TO AID NARS IDENTIFY UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

Generally speaking, information that concerns intelligence activities, sources, and methods is classified. Intelligence activities, by their nature, must be carried out in secrecy and the records they generate must be protected for many years. This latter point was reflected in the waiver approved by ISOO which established a period of 30 years for the systematic re-review of such information. Generally speaking, we believe that information concerning intelligence activities, sources, and methods must be protected for a minimum of 75 years. In spite of the general need and the longevity required for protection of intelligence-related information, some of this material may carry no classification markings and be found among unclassified records. This could happen in records relating to cover, to the creation and maintenance of proprietary organizations, to obtaining support from outside organizations, and to any dealings that extend outside the service itself. Cover is an open and overt status that provides a plausible explanation for the presence and activities of an intelligence service. Cover is an open and legal device and when it is provided by another government agency the records generated may well be unclassified.

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Many of their activities are carried out overtly and correspondence relating to such activities will not be classified. A proprietary organization is an overt business entity owned or controlled by an intelligence service that is used to provide cover for conducting intelligence operations. Normally, a proprietary operates openly and does not generate classified information. What is sensitive and requires protection is the connection between the "proprietary" and the intelligence service. Some "proprietaries," like Air America, may deal with many U.S. Government agencies, and their correspondence could be found in the records of these agencies. Finally, an intelligence service must get all manner

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
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of support from other organizations both governmental and private. This will include all the materials and services that are required to keep a large and diverse organization functioning, help in the development and manufacture of many items, some of which are very esoteric, and consultations on just about every subject imaginable. The sensitivity of the records surrounding these activities is twofold: it is necessary to protect the intelligence service so that its work is not compromised; and it is necessary to protect the business, institute, private enterprise, or government agency which could be damaged by revelations of involvement with an intelligence service and result in denying further support from that entity. Furthermore, as in all sensitive intelligence service activities, confidentiality and discretion are promised or implied and this trust cannot be abandoned lightly.

Administrative documents form one category of records where unclassified documents of interest to CIA will be found.

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

documents that do not carry a classification marking still should be protected under the authority of this letter.

3. Foreign Liaison. The CIA has the U. S. Government responsibility to maintain liaison with foreign intelligence and security services. The U. S. Government policy for such liaison, as expressed by the National Security Council, is ^{AS FOLLOWS:} (a) the fact of broad general intelligence cooperation with countries or groups of countries with which the U. S. maintains formal military alliances or agreements is unclassified; (b) the fact of intelligence cooperation between the U. S. and a specific foreign service or governmental component in an allied country or description of the nature of intelligence cooperation between the U. S. and an allied country is classified; (c) the same is true for specifically-named foreign countries and governmental components thereof with which the U. S. is not allied; (d) details of or specifics concerning any intelligence exchange agreement ^{ARE} ~~is~~ classified as are the identities of foreign governmental or military personnel who provide intelligence pursuant to a liaison relationship; and (e) classified information resulting from a foreign liaison relationship may be declassified only in accordance with the mutual desire of the U.S. and the foreign government. All documents relating to foreign liaison with intelligence and security services will be classified and generally will remain so. Should any documents relating to liaison with foreign intelligence and security services ~~be~~ ^{are} found that are not marked classified, they should be held for CIA review.

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5. Security Problems. When there is a threat to U.S. personnel, facilities, or activities overseas, CIA will usually play a role in investigating and neutralizing that threat. CIA performs all kinds of investigative actions abroad including liaison with foreign security services who could play a role in this type of situation. CIA abroad also supports other U.S. agencies by providing name traces for visas, or on local hire employees, bidders for U.S. contracts, U.S. Government grantees, the senders of "nut" letters, etc. Correspondence generated from investigative work will normally be classified but care must be taken

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since routine background investigative work related to local hires and other common administrative matters could be unclassified.

6. U.S. Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence. CIA is responsible for (a) coordinating all clandestine activities conducted outside the U.S. or that involving foreign clandestine services (as noted above); (b) coordinating clandestine activities with overt collection activities conducted abroad; ^{AND} (c) ^ecoordinating the arrangements for cover support required by any other department or agency to carry out authorized clandestine activities and which cover will utilize the facilities of, or become identified with, other departments or agencies of the government or nongovernmental organizations. CIA also has the primary responsibility to: (a) conduct espionage and clandestine counterintelligence outside the U.S. as a service of common concern; (b) conduct liaison with foreign security and intelligence services; ^{AND} (c) maintain central indexes and records of foreign counterintelligence information for the benefit of the intelligence community and to which all departments and agencies are to contribute. Other departments and agencies with commands or installations located outside the U.S. may: (a) conduct supplementary espionage to satisfy departmental intelligence needs; (b) conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the security of their personnel, commands, activities, and installations; and (c) conduct liaison with foreign clandestine services or, when concerning the clandestine activities described in paragraphs a and b immediately above, with foreign intelligence or security services. Intelligence collection requirements, and assessments of the value of the information collected, will be provided as guidance to CIA from various departments and agencies and vice versa. In foreign areas, the CIA will ensure that the senior U.S. representative is appropriately advised of U.S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities conducted in or affecting the area. In a foreign area where major

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U.S. military commands are stationed, the CIA representative will keep senior U.S. military commanders informed of the espionage and clandestine counter-intelligence activities and operations conducted by the CIA in or from such areas, including the liaison between CIA and foreign military establishments. Records generated from these activities normally will be classified.

ATTACHMENT:

**KEYWORDS, AND PHRASES, TITLES, DESIGNATORS, AND
FILE NUMBERS THAT MAY INDICATE CIA INTEREST**

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The proposed guidelines have been written with the objective of:

(1) describing the various types of activities CIA engages in; (2) indicating what records these activities would generate; and (3) suggesting where those records may be found particularly if they are unclassified. Since we do not have a great deal of experience with unclassified records of other U.S. Government agencies, the proposed guidelines will be rather tentative. We hope that with experience they can be expanded upon and made more useful. A copy of the guidelines is attached.

We appreciated the opportunity of discussing this issue with your personnel. They presented the problem very clearly and we found the frank and free exchange of views most informative and helpful. If you or your staff should desire further discussion of this issue, please do not hesitate to contact us.

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Many of their activities are carried out overtly and correspondence relating to such activities will not be classified. A proprietary ^{ORGANIZATION} is an overt business entity owned or controlled by an intelligence service that is used to provide cover ^{FOR CONDUCTING INTELL. OPERATIONS}. Normally, a "proprietary" operates openly and does not generate classified information. What is sensitive and requires

protection is the connection between the proprietary and the intelligence service. Some "proprietarys," like Air America, may deal with many U.S. Government agencies and their correspondence could ^{be found} turn up in the records of these agencies. Finally, an intelligence service must get all manner of support from other organizations both governmental and private. This will include all the materials and services that are required to keep a large and diverse organization functioning, help in the development and manufacture of many items some of which are very esoteric, and consultations on just about every subject imaginable. The sensitivity of the records surrounding these activities is twofold: it is necessary to protect the intelligence service so that its work is not compromised; and it is necessary to protect the business, institute, private enterprise, or government agency which could be damaged by revelations of involvement with an intelligence service and result in denying further support from that entity. Furthermore, as in all sensitive intelligence service activities, confidentiality and discretion are promised or implied and this trust cannot be abandoned lightly.

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2. Intelligence Reporting. This includes CIA-originated reports although CIA-obtained information may be found in the reporting of other U.S. agencies. The latter is particularly true of State and military reporting because of the strong similarity in, and the common targets among, these agencies. Generally, almost all such reports will be classified and if dated after 1 January 1946 are automatically exempt from declassification by authority of the letter from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist of the United States dated 16 October 1978. Any such reports that are not classified will still be protected under this letter, *and should be called to the attention of CIA (?)*
3. Foreign Liaison. The CIA has the U. S. Government responsibility to maintain liaison with foreign intelligence and security services. The U. S. Government policy for such liaison, as expressed by the National Security Council, is: (a) The fact of broad general intelligence cooperation with countries or groups of countries with which the U. S. maintains formal military alliances or agreements is

unclassified; (b) The fact of ^{specific} intelligence cooperation between the U. S. and a ~~specific~~ foreign service or governmental component in an allied country or ^{a country} description of the nature of intelligence cooperation between the U. S. and an allied country is classified; (c) The same is true for specifically-named foreign countries and governmental components thereof with which the U. S. is not allied; (d) Details of or specifics concerning any intelligence exchange agreement is classified, as are the identities of foreign governmental or military personnel who provide intelligence pursuant to a liaison relationship; and (e) Classified information resulting from a foreign liaison relationship may be declassified only in accordance with the mutual desire of the U.S. and the foreign government. All documents relating to foreign liaison with intelligence and security services ~~will be~~ ^{are} classified and generally will remain so. ^{If} ~~Should~~ any documents relating to liaison with foreign intelligence and security services ~~be~~ ^{are} found that are not ^{marked} classified, they should be held for CIA review.

4. Defectors and Refugees. The CIA plays a primary role in receiving, debriefing, and handling defectors. This is coordinated with other U.S. Government agencies in terms both of sharing the product and providing support. State and the military services are most often involved and the correspondence generated in coordinating this activity ~~will be~~ ^{is} classified. Reports obtained from the defector ~~have been~~ ^{will be} sent to interested U.S. Government agencies and such reports ~~will be~~ ^{are} classified and exempt from declassification under the Director's letter as cited above. The handling of refugees is a more integrated U.S. Government activity. State is primarily responsible but CIA and the military services play an important role including the joint management of refugee reception centers. Some refugee processing facilities

have been managed jointly by CIA and foreign liaison services. These facilities process refugees from reception through debriefing after which they normally are sent on to resettlement camps run by local governments or international agencies. CIA's principal responsibility is to see that all the intelligence information is obtained, and that all counterintelligence questions are identified and resolved. Correspondence generated ~~will~~ includes that necessary to provide for the support of the facility, that which provides a record of the activity, and the intelligence reports published. Correspondence dealing with administering and processing refugees may be unclassified, that involved with defectors ~~will~~ ^{should} never be. Intelligence reports resulting from the debriefings of refugees or defectors normally ~~will be~~ ^{is} classified and exempt from declassification under the Director's letter as cited above.

5. Security Problems. When there is a threat to U.S. personnel, facilities or activities overseas, CIA will usually play a role in investigating and neutralizing that threat. CIA performs all kinds of investigative actions abroad including liaison with foreign security services who could play a role in this type of situation. CIA abroad also supports other U.S. agencies by providing name traces for visas, ~~or on~~ local hire employees, ~~on~~ bidders for U.S. contracts, ~~on~~ U.S. Government grantees, ~~or~~ ^{or} the senders of "nut" letters, etc. Correspondence generated from investigative work will normally be classified, but care must be taken since routine background investigative work related to local hires and other common administrative matters could be unclassified.
6. U.S. Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence. CIA is responsible for (a) Coordinating all clandestine activities conducted outside the U.S. or that involving foreign clandestine services (as noted above);

(b) Coordinating clandestine activities with overt collection activities conducted abroad; (c) Coordinating the arrangements for cover support required by any other department or agency to carry out authorized clandestine activities and which cover will utilize the facilities of, or become identified with, other departments or agencies of the government or nongovernmental organizations. CIA also has the primary responsibility to: (a) Conduct espionage and clandestine counterintelligence outside the U.S. as a service of common concern; (b) Conduct liaison with foreign security and intelligence services; (c) Maintain central indexes and records of foreign counterintelligence information for the benefit of the intelligence community and to which all departments and agencies are to contribute. Other departments and agencies with commands or installations located outside the U.S. may: (a) Conduct supplementary espionage to satisfy departmental intelligence needs; (b) Conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the security of their personnel, commands, activities, and installations; and (c) Conduct liaison with foreign clandestine services or, when concerning the clandestine activities described in paragraphs a and b immediately above, with foreign intelligence or security services. Intelligence collection requirements and assessments of the value of the information collected will be provided as guidance to CIA from various departments and agencies and vice versa. In foreign areas, the CIA will ensure that the senior U.S. representative is appropriately advised of U.S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities conducted in or affecting the area. In a foreign area where major U.S. military commands are stationed, the CIA representative will keep senior U.S. military commanders informed of the espionage and clandestine counter-intelligence activities and operations conducted

by the CIA in or from such areas, including the liaison between
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CIA and foreign military establishments. Records generated from
these activities normally will be classified.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		14 Oct 81
TO: Chief, S & T <i>143</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
F. Y. I. AND COMMENTS.		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
TO: Chief, CRI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p><i>c/ops</i> _____</p> <p><i>ce sent c/MPG/IMS on 10 Nov 81</i></p> <p>F. Y. I. AND COMMENTS.</p> <p>EXCELLENT. SOME EDITORIAL SUGGESTIONS. WHAT ABOUT THE CLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT?</p> <p><i>Editorial comments are fine. One question, Should I add a para on Special Ops. 27 Oct 81</i></p> <p><i>Letter is unclear, guide CONF.</i></p>		
FROM:		
NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

241

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

STAT

For the record:

Copies for coordination were
sent on this date to:

PCS/PGLO

CCS/

STAT

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)

Date

1. [] [] 19 JAN 82

2. [] []

3. [] []

4. [] []

5. [] []

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

Back from [] who scratched one sentence on pg 6. I have no problem with that deletion. He also suggests coordination with PCS. Why not? OK []

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Room No.—Bldg.

Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979-291-184/1

STAT



*Pls make me two copies of
the attached.*

Thanks,



STAT

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

CRD/OIS/DDA
322 Ames

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

26 January 1982

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. PCS/PGLO
2E 114 Hdqs

2. Attn:

5/11/82

- Per our discussion by phone today. Appreciate your help.

TRW

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM
3-62

610

USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS



SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL



INTERNAL
USE ONLY



UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

OPS/CRD/OIS

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 10 November 1981

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/MPG/IMS/DO

ATTN:

12 Nov 1981

3 Dec

This is the guideline that was requested by NARS at our June meeting with them at NARS. Do you have any comments, suggestions, etc.? We would like to get it to NARS as soon as we can because it has been a while since our meeting.

2. C/RMB

3.

4. OPS/CRD/OIS

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

1-2: Per our discussion please assign this to and have him come see me.

 -
1-4: Returned per our phone conversation. Only comments are those which are paper-clipped.

You may wish to check intelligence reports section, foreign liaison section, and security section with DO/PCS for accuracy because of policy implications.

SUBJECT: Guideline for Identifying and Reviewing
Information of Interest to CIA Including
Information Not ~~Marked~~^{Bearing} with a Classification
Marking

1. On 5 June 1979 the Dir of CIA,
Adm. Stanfield Turner, sent to the Archivist
of the U.S., ~~Dr. James B. Rhoads~~^{Dr. James B. Rhoads}, the
Systematic Review Guidelines
which were to be used with info of
CIA interest. Those guidelines identified
and described 29 categories of sensitive
info which related to CIA activities,
~~that~~ were exempt from automatic
declassification, and ~~that~~^{that} would require review
for declass by designated CIA personnel.
One area of info of interest to CIA that
was not covered was that info appearing
in documents not marked with any
classification. This guideline attempts to
correct ~~that deficiency~~^{that deficiency} by ~~describing~~
government

where info of CIA interest could be found whether marked classified or not; and c) codewords, key words and phrases, numbers, titles, and other indicators which reflect the presence of a CIA interest.

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The Weekly Report of 18-24 June 1981 referred to a meeting held at NARS on 17 June, during which the NARS leadership described their review procedures and then proceeded to levy a request for guidelines which could be used by their reviewers when they encounter materials that bear no classification markings. The NARS people are understandably concerned because they will continue to be faced with the usual mass of paper but, in addition, the reviewers will be further challenged by a plethora of unmarked documents, possibly often devoid of the usual indicators, benchmarks or signals ~~noted by~~ recognized and stressed by us that indicated to the NARS reviewer that the material under review was deserving of ~~Agency~~ Agency attention STAT

Solutions to the above dilemma do not readily come to mind but, in the interest both of protecting our classification equities as well as alleviating NARS's concerns there are some suggestions we could offer that might form a basis for conducting ongoing ~~reviews~~ CRD reviews: ■

A. If it has not already been done, we should have a "sit-down" with Allan T to find out just how they go about surveying the material that has been accessioned. Are computer ~~print-outs~~ print-outs made of the material and could the titles and descriptions be made available so that we might be able to nominate segments or ~~portions~~ portions/topics that might provide clues of sensitivity and interest to us? We obviously do not want to get involved in the NARS survey process ~~itself~~ as ~~much~~ such but it might be helpful if we could review the print-outs of the survey which might permit us to get the flavor of the material which, in turn, might help to flag ~~some~~ certain areas or segments that might embrace or reflect matters or materials that appear to hold a special interest for us. STAT

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Washington D.C. 20505

5 JUN 1979

Dr. James B. Rhoads
Archivist of the United States
National Archives and Records Service
Eighth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20408

Dear Dr. Rhoads:

Pursuant to Section 3-402 of Executive Order 12065, I hereby issue and enclose for your use the required systematic review guidelines covering classified information of United States origin and more than twenty years old over which the Central Intelligence Agency has classification jurisdiction. These guidelines were prepared in consultation with your designated representative Mr. Edwin A. Thompson, Director of the Records Declassification Division, National Archives and Records Service.

Copies of this letter and of the enclosed guidelines have been forwarded to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) for his review, as provided by the Order. Systematic review guidelines for "foreign government information" as defined in Section 6-103 of the Order and in Section I/F of ISOO Directive No. 1 will be provided at a later date, in compliance with the provisions of the Order and Directive concerning such information.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

Enclosure

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW GUIDELINES

A. Authorization. The following guidelines apply to information of United States origin which is more than 20 years old and over which the Central Intelligence Agency has classification jurisdiction. Under the provisions of Section 3-402 of Executive Order 12065, the CIA authorizes the Archivist of the United States to use these guidelines in the review of such information upon its transfer to the General Services Administration and accession into the National Archives.

B. Categories of Information Excepted from Automatic Declassification. Except for foreign government information, which is exempt from automatic declassification under Section 3-404 of the Order, all classified information over 20 years old which is under the classification jurisdiction of this agency is automatically declassified unless it falls into one of the categories described below. Information in these categories shall not be declassified until reviewed for declassification by designated CIA personnel, and must be referred to CIA for such review by all other agencies having custody thereof. Information in Categories 1 through 5 below is subject to another systematic review on the dates specified in parentheses under each of those five categories upon approval of Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) 10-year-review requirement waivers as provided in Section 3-401 of the Order. Otherwise, information in all categories listed below shall be so re-reviewed at 10-year intervals, as necessary until it can be declassified or assigned a date or event for automatic declassification. Category 29 is a new category under Section 1-301(g) of the Order.

CATEGORY 1

Information constituting or concerning cryptologic or cryptographic intelligence, including information on the development and/or use of any method, means, system, device, installation or activity for the acquisition or transmission of such intelligence or for the protection of cryptographically processed data including cryptographic, communications and emanations security procedures, techniques, materials and equipment.

(Next Review Date: 40 years following initial review.)

CATEGORY 2

Information constituting or concerning counterintelligence, defined by Executive Order 12036 of 24 January 1978 (Section 4-202) as "...information

gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, sabotage, international terrorist activities or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs."

(Next Review Date: 30 years following initial review.)

CATEGORY 3

Information concerning or covered by special access, distribution and protection programs continued or established pursuant to Section 4-2 of Executive Order 12065, including but not limited to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

(Next Review Date: 30 years following initial review.)

CATEGORY 4

Information which identifies any undercover personnel or unit(s), or clandestine human agent(s), of the Central Intelligence Agency or of a predecessor agency; or which otherwise reveals sensitive intelligence sources, methods or activities including intelligence plans, policies, or operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, a predecessor agency, or any element of either.

(Next Review Date: 30 years following initial review.)

CATEGORY 5

Information covertly acquired which is contained in intelligence reports and other documents that bear the legend "THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION" or, lacking this or an equivalent marking, are similar in format or content to items so marked; and in which the formats used, subject matter, source descriptions or other content would, in collections or aggregates of such reports and/or other documents, reveal the nature, scope or extent of United States intelligence activities in, or in relation to, particular foreign countries or areas or would identify intelligence sources or methods.

(Next Review Date: 30 years following initial review.)

CATEGORY 6

Information which reveals or identifies a present, past, or prospective intelligence source, whether a person, organization, group, technical

system, mechanism, device, or any other means or instrument that provides, has provided, or is being developed to provide intelligence.

CATEGORY 7

Information which reveals or identifies a present, past, or prospective intelligence method, procedure, mode, technique, or requirement used or being developed to acquire, transmit, analyze, correlate, evaluate, or process intelligence or to support an intelligence source, operation, or activity.

CATEGORY 8

Information that discloses the organizational structure of the Central Intelligence Agency; the numbers and assignments of CIA personnel; the size and composition of the CIA budget, including internal and external funding; logistical and associated support activities and services; security procedures, techniques, and activities including those applicable to the fields of communications and data processing; or other quantitative or qualitative data revealing or indicating the nature, objectives, requirements, priorities, scope or thrust of CIA activities, including the missions, functions, and locations of certain CIA components or installations.

CATEGORY 9

Information pertaining to intelligence-related methodologies, techniques, formulae, equipment, programs or models, including computer simulations, ranging from initial requirements through planning, source acquisition, contract initiation, research, design, and testing to production, personnel training, and operational use.

CATEGORY 10

Information which identifies research, procedures, or data used by CIA in the acquisition and processing of intelligence or the production of finished intelligence, when such identification could reveal the particular intelligence interest of the CIA, the value of the intelligence, or the extent of the CIA's knowledge of a particular subject of intelligence interest.

CATEGORY 11

Information pertaining to training in intelligence sources, methods, and activities provided under the auspices of CIA to individuals, organizations, or groups that could reveal or identify equipment, materials, training sites, methods and techniques of instruction, or the identities of students and instructors.

CATEGORY 12

Information that could disclose CIA policies and procedures used for personnel recruitment, assessment, selection, training, assignment, and evaluation.

CATEGORY 13

Information that could lead to foreign political, economic, or military action against the United States or other friendly nations.

CATEGORY 14

Information that could create, stimulate, or increase international tensions in such manner as to impair the conduct of United States foreign policies.

CATEGORY 15

Information that could deprive the United States of a diplomatic or economic advantage related to the national security, or that could weaken the position of the United States or its allies in international negotiations, or adversely affect other activities pertinent to the resolution or avoidance of international conflicts or differences having national security significance.

CATEGORY 16

Information concerning plans prepared, under preparation, or contemplated by officials of the United States to meet diplomatic or other contingencies affecting the national security.

CATEGORY 17

Information that identifies or otherwise reveals activities conducted abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives, and planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly; or information that discloses support provided to such activities.

CATEGORY 18

Information revealing that the United States has obtained, or seeks to obtain, certain data or materials from or concerning a foreign nation, organization, or group; the disclosure of which information could adversely affect United States relations with or activities in a foreign country.

CATEGORY 19

Information that could lead to political or economic instability, or to civil disorder or unrest, in a foreign country or jeopardize the lives, liberty, or property of United States persons in such a country or could endanger United States Government personnel or installations there.

CATEGORY 20

Information concerning foreign intentions, capabilities, or activities which could pose a potential threat to United States national security interests or to those of allied or other friendly governments.

CATEGORY 21

Information indicating the extent of, or degree of success achieved by, United States collection of intelligence on and assessment of foreign military plans, weapons, capabilities, or operations.

CATEGORY 22

Information revealing defense plans or posture of the United States, its allies, or other friendly countries or enabling a foreign nation or entity to develop countermeasures to such plans or posture.

CATEGORY 23

Information disclosing the capabilities, vulnerabilities, or deployment of United States weapons or weapons systems.

CATEGORY 24

Information that continues to provide the United States with a scientific, technical, engineering, economic, or intelligence advantage of value to the national security.

CATEGORY 25

Information concerning research of a scientific or technical nature leading to the development of special techniques, procedures, equipment and equipment configurations, systems, or devices for collection or production of foreign intelligence; or the operational planning for, deployment or use thereof in such collection or production, or for other national security purposes.

CATEGORY 26

Information concerning United States Government programs to safeguard nuclear materials, techniques, capabilities, or facilities that could compromise, jeopardize or reduce the effectiveness of such programs.

CATEGORY 27

Information on foreign nuclear programs, activities, capabilities, technologies, facilities, plans and intentions, weapons and their deployment that could disclose the nature, scope, or effectiveness of United States intelligence efforts to monitor nuclear developments abroad or could cause such efforts to fail or be restricted in a manner detrimental to national security.

CATEGORY 28

Information pertaining to contractual relationships or joint arrangements with individuals, commercial concerns or other entities when such a relationship or arrangement involves a specific intelligence interest, or reveals the extent or depth of knowledge or technical expertise possessed by CIA, or when disclosure of the relationship or arrangements could jeopardize the other party's willingness or ability to provide services to CIA.

CATEGORY 29

Information that could result in or lead to action(s) placing an individual in jeopardy.

C. Agency Assistance to the National Archives. This agency has designated experienced personnel to guide and assist National Archives personnel in identifying and separating documents and specific elements of information within documents under these categories that are deemed to require continued protection. These CIA-designated personnel are authorized to declassify categories of information exempted from automatic declassification (listed in the preceding section) if it is determined that they no longer require protection. These CIA personnel will make recommendations for continued classification of the documents or categories of information requiring continued protection.

D. Continuing Application of Earlier Guidelines. The systematic review guidelines and instructions identified below shall remain in effect until canceled or superseded:

1. Downgrading instructions provided in the letter of 16 April 1973 from Lawrence R. Houston, Central Intelligence Agency General Counsel, to Dr. James B. Rhoads, Archivist of the United States.

2. Instructions concerning information on Secret Writing (S/W), cited in the letter of 8 June 1973 from [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency Archivist, to Mr. Edwin A. Thompson, Director of the Records Declassification Division, National Archives and Records Service.

STAT

STAT 3. Guidelines concerning Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) material, cited in the letter of 23 August 1977 to Mr. Edwin A. Thompson, Director of the Records Declassification Service, National Archives and Records Service, from [REDACTED], Central Intelligence Agency Senior Review Officer.

4. Central Intelligence Agency issuance dated 11 December 1978 and entitled "GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF CIA PREDECESSOR RECORDS AND INFORMATION BETWEEN 1941-1946", signed by [REDACTED] Chief of the Classification Review Group, Information Systems Analysis Staff, Directorate of Administration.

STAT

STANSFIELD TURNER

Meeting on 17 June
at NARS

3 June 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Management Staff, DO
Chief, Classification Review Division
Chief, Information and Privacy Division
Office of General Counsel

STAT FROM:

[Redacted]
Chief, Records Management Division

SUBJECT: Meeting on 17 June 1981 at the National Archives

Attached is background information for the meeting we will be attending at NARS on 17 June at 1 p.m. to discuss with Dr. Edward Weldon Agency concerns about protection of unclassified U.S. intelligence information in NARS custody. This background information consists of an exchange of letters between the DCI and the Acting Administrator of GSA and minutes of a 4 March 1981 meeting of Agency personnel of this and other subjects. Before 17 June I will inform all participants of the room number for the meeting.

Attachment
a/s

cc: DIS
C/RSB

[Redacted] STAT

OIS Registry

81-07/3

FOIA Registry

81-0337/1

27 APR 1981

Administrative Processing

81-3994

Mr. Ray Kline
Acting Administrator
General Services Administration
18th & F Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20405

Dear Mr. Kline:

I would appreciate your cooperation on a matter recently brought to my attention. It concerns the need for formalized procedures within the National Archives and Records Service to protect from disclosure certain unclassified or unmarked United States intelligence information. The information of concern is that which by law is my responsibility as Director of Central Intelligence to protect, whether or not it is national security classified.

This responsibility derives from section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, which requires that I protect intelligence sources and methods information from unauthorized disclosure. In furtherance of this requirement, section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 exempts CIA from any law which requires disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency.

To ensure my legal responsibilities under both Acts are fulfilled, I request that the National Archives and Records Service establish procedures that will protect from disclosure all U.S. Government information in its legal custody concerning intelligence sources and methods, whether national security classified or not, unless previously officially released or approved for release by the Director of Central Intelligence or an official authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence.

*Can we ignore
the Third
agency rule?*

Your agreement to this request will provide authority for personnel of the National Archives and Records Service to protect such information. I have been advised of and appreciate their continuing efforts to protect intelligence information from unauthorized disclosure.

Sincerely,

/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey

MINUTES

FOIA Exemptions (b)(3) and (b)(1), OSS Records, and
E.O. 12065 Requests

4 March 1981

1. Discussion of implications of use of FOIA (b)(3) (sources and methods) exemption, without use of (b)(1) (classification) exemption, and its impact upon NARS' ability to protect CIA's information in NARS' custody. Included is discussion of NARS' claim of inconsistency between applications under FOIA and E.O. 12065.

After extensive discussion on the use of the (b)(3) (sources and methods) exemption without the use of the (b)(1) (classification) exemption, several actions were proposed as follows:

a. A technical amendment should be proposed to E.O. 12065 which would delegate from the DCI to a lower senior level the authority to classify a document after the fact when one is located under the FOIA process which merits classification. Records Management Division, OIS has the action on this particular item.

b. Amend E.O. 12065 to include a statement that identifies sources and methods, organizational titles, names of employees, etc., as constituting identifiable damage if released. Action on this item has been assigned to RMD/OIS.

c. A letter be prepared to the Administrator of General Services (or the Archivist of the U.S., as appropriate) signed by the DCI which establishes an inter-agency agreement making intelligence information which concerns sources and methods as an area which automatically requires continued protection to the National Archives even though it is not marked as classified information. RMD/OIS is to prepare a draft of this letter and coordinate it with all appropriate Agency components and with appropriate personnel at NARS. Upon completion of all coordination, this letter will be sent from OIS to the Director for signature with a copy to Director, ISOO.

What coordination was accomplished?

d. IPD is to review all FOIA cases where (b)(3) is claimed without claiming (b)(1). In these instances, IPD is to make contact with the originating office to determine whether (b)(1) can also be claimed. If neither a component nor IPD can justify using the (b)(1) exemption, it is to be referred to the Director of Information Services, DDA (DIS/DDA) for a determination. These efforts should avoid the confusion that now arises at NARS when only (b)(3) is claimed. IPD should circulate a note to all FOIA personnel establishing the policy that is to be followed when only (b)(3) is claimed.

STAT

3. Discussion of restrictions placed on Agency OSS records in NARS' custody.

It was agreed that NARS is in the process of deciding whether the records should be returned to the Agency. Because the DO is prepared to service requests for the OSS records rather than lift any restrictions now placed on OSS records, it was agreed to wait for NARS to make its determination and then for the Agency to accept custody of the OSS records.

4. Discussion of E.O. 12065 mandatory review requests being handled in same queue as FOIA and PA requests on a first-in, first-out basis.

After having heard further expansion of the manner in which the DO maintains its E.O. 12065 queue thus being ensured that there was really a separate queue for E.O. 12065 requests, the Office of General Counsel representative felt that we could defend their handling of the E.O. 12065 requests and still not be in violation of IPD's practice that advises that requests are processed on a first-in, first-out basis.

STAT

Thomas H. White

Director of Information Services, DDA



General

Services

Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060005-7

Administration Washington, DC 20405

OIS Registry

81-179/

Rec'd 15 May 81

81-0539/2

Executive Registry

81-3994/

4 May 1981

Honorable William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

This is in response to your letter of April 27 regarding intelligence records in the legal custody of the National Archives and Records Service. I fully share your determination to protect from unwarranted disclosure sensitive U.S. Government information concerning intelligence sources and methods.

Officials at the National Archives are anxious to discuss your concerns and explain current National Archives procedures for protecting information about intelligence sources and methods as well as information about the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. I have asked Dr. Edward Weldon, Deputy Archivist of the United States, to assume responsibility for clarifying and resolving the concerns addressed in your letter. Please ask your representative to contact him directly at the National Archives and Records Service, Washington, DC 20408, 523-3132, to arrange a meeting between your staff and his.

I have asked Dr. Weldon to keep me fully informed about this matter. If I can help further, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Ray K. Ramey
Director

Honorable William F. Friedman
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060005-7
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

This is in response to your letter of April 27 regarding intelligence records in the legal custody of the National Archives and Records Service. I fully share your determination to protect from unwarranted disclosure sensitive U.S. Government information concerning intelligence sources and methods.

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I have asked Dr. Weldon to keep me fully informed about this matter. If I can help further, please let me know.

Sincerely,

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060005-7

Letter to GSA re Intelligence Information in NARS

FROM: Max Hugel Deputy Director for Administration 7D18 Headquarters		EXTENSION		NO.
				DATE 1 APR 1967
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. OGC 7C36 Headquarters				<p>NARS management personnel recently brought to our attention their need for authority to establish procedures to protect unclassified or unmarked intelligence sources and methods information from unauthorized disclosure. At the present NARS can protect such information only when it is properly classified and marked in accordance with Executive Order 12065 "National Security Information."</p> <p>The Acting Administrator of General Services agreement with your request will provide NARS with the needed authority and help to ensure that your responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1947 are fulfilled.</p> <p><i>Signed</i> Max Hugel</p> <p>Note: We understand that some personnel within NARS may take exception to enforcing DCI authority on other than CIA records.</p>
2.				
3. DDCI 7E12 Headquarters				
4.				
5. DCI 7E12 Headquarters				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1-79 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060005-7

27 APR 81

Mr. Ray Kline
Acting Administrator
General Services Administration
18th & F Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20405

Dear Mr. Kline:

I would appreciate your cooperation on a matter recently brought to my attention. It concerns the need for formalized procedures within the National Archives and Records Service to protect from disclosure certain unclassified or unmarked United States intelligence information. The information of concern is that which by law is my responsibility as Director of Central Intelligence to protect, whether or not it is national security classified.

This responsibility derives from section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, which requires that I protect intelligence sources and methods information from unauthorized disclosure. In furtherance of this requirement, section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 exempts CIA from any law which requires disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency.

To ensure my legal responsibilities under both Acts are fulfilled, I request that the National Archives and Records Service establish procedures that will protect from disclosure all U.S. Government information in its legal custody concerning intelligence sources and methods, whether national security classified or not, unless previously officially released or approved for release by the Director of Central Intelligence or an official authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Your agreement to this request will provide authority for personnel of the National Archives and Records Service to protect such information. I have been advised of and appreciate their continuing efforts to protect intelligence information from unauthorized disclosure.

Sincerely,

75/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey

Meeting, June 17

Central Intelligence Agency

Tom White, Director of Information Services

Deputy Director of Information Services

, Chief, Records Management Division

Chief, Records System Branch

Records Management Officer, Director of Operations

Freedom of Information Officer, Director of Operations

Office of General Counsel

Records Declassification Division

Chief, Information and Privacy Division

Information Security Oversight Office

Steve Garfinkel

National Archives

Ed Weldon, Deputy Archivist

Gary Brooks, Office of General Counsel, GSA

Alan Thompson, Director, Records Declassification Division

Milt Gustafson, Chief, Diplomatic Records Branch

Bob Wolfe, Chief, Modern Military Records Branch

Janet Hargett, Chief, Reference Branch, General Archives Division

Jerry Tagge, Records Disposition Division

Mary Ann Wallace, Director, Program Coordination Staff

Bill Leary, Program Coordination Staff

Alan Thompson - 95% CIA info NARS encounters is classified. Syst Review at 25-30 years i.e. early fifties (1952 average).

Procedures:

Borrow records from custodial

Withdraw class where no guide

Agency guides don't give much leeway to declass.

Agency specialists called in to review at NARS/Suit

Declass returned to custodial units

Milt Gustafson - State 40-44 + 45-49

Custodial - FOIA request of WN

Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060005-7

Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060005-7

Paper On -

1. Situations in which CIA interests might be found:
 - a. CIA docs
 - b. Other Agency docs in which CIA ~~docs~~ are quoted
 - c. Other agency docs which make reference to CIA personnel, facilities, activities, or information.
 - d.
2. Type & nature of docs in which info of interest to CIA may be found.
 - a.

~~Where info might be found:~~
Where info might ~~be found:~~
(In what type does)

1. CIA info, rpt, etc.
2. Mil Att corres in which he might refer to CIA info, personnel, etc.
3. State docs referring to CIA personnel, etc

In what type of files might such docs be found:

1. State files of certain type.
2. Mil att files

Guidelines

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:		EXTENSION		NO.
CRD/OPS				
DATE		DATE		
19 June 1981		19 June 1981		
O. (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. STAT: [Redacted]	22 June 81			<p>Herewith are the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Director's letter to the Archivist. 2. The Archivist's letter to the Director. 3. The CIA Systematic Review Guidelines sent to WARS in June 1979. <p>Needed are ideas and suggestions, preferably in writing, as to how we can help WARS personnel recognize information of CIA interest in unclassified, unmarked, or declassified documents. This could be on documents not marked with a classification, or it could be information that is not classifiable but we want to protect under the Director's authority to protect sources and methods and certain CIA organizational data.</p>
2. [Redacted]	JUN 1981			
3. [Redacted]	JUN 1981			
4. [Redacted]	24/6			
5. [Redacted]				
6. [Redacted]				
7. [Redacted]				
8. [Redacted]	6 July 81			
9. [Redacted]				
10. [Redacted]				
11. STAT: [Redacted]				
12. [Redacted]				
13. [Redacted]				
14. [Redacted]				
15. [Redacted]				

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

CRD/OPS

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

19 June 1981

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

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15.

Herewith are the following:

1. The Director's letter to the Archivist.

2. The Archivist's letter to the Director.

3. The CIA Systematic Review Guidelines sent to NARS in June 1979.

Needed are ideas and suggestions, preferably in writing, as to how we can help NARS personnel recognize information of CIA interest in unclassified, unmarked, or declassified documents. This could be in documents not marked with a classification, or it could be information that is not classifiable but we want to protect under the Director's authority to protect sources and methods and certain CIA organizational data.



STAT

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p><i>Doubt this will help you much I'm afraid, but the intention was there</i></p>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BU	TENSION

FORM NO. 241
FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)